TIDAL WAVE
by John Vitkus

On August 1, 1943, 1729 American airmen and one Brit embarked on one of the widest rides in USAAF history the low-level raid on the refineries of Ploesti, Romania, code named Tidal Wave.

The Planning. Tidal Wave was perhaps the most thoroughly planned USAAF raid ever. The U.S. Model Makers Detachment built a 1. 5000 scale 3- dimensional model of Ploesti' with 10 of its surrounding refinery complexes, detailed down to 'individual trees and hedges. (Now there's a combat assignment for modelers!) Also, a 1: 1 scale 2-dimensional model of Ploesti was laid out in the desert to practice target location.

General Lewis Brereton, 9th USAAF CO, OK'd the low-level plan for three reasons: bombing accuracy, fuel savings, and surprise. It seems incredible to think that 178 B-24s flying at I 00' across 400 miles of occupied territory could surprise anyone, but in fact the raiders were not fired on until they reached the outskirts of Ploesti. Five bomb groups (the 98th and 376th of 9th Bomber Command and the 44th, 93rd, and rookie 389th borrowed from 8th Bomber Command) were assigned to bomb 7 targets from the west, more or less simultaneously. Each attack would consist of 4-6 waves, with 6-10 B-24s flying abreast in each wave. Bombs from the lead wave were fused for delays of 2-6 hours; those in the last wave were delayed 45 seconds.

Of course, a low-level raid 'involves greater risks, not only from light AA fire but also from balloon cables, chimneys, and power lines.--Navigation at low-level is also much more difficult. In preflight pep talks, Brereton argued that the elimination of Ploesti was so vital that even 100% casualties would be acceptable. Although this attitude impressed the airmen with the importance of their mission, it did little for their confidence.

Meanwhile Oberst Karl Cy6rstenberg, German commander at Ploesti, was making plans of his own. Light AA, hidden in flak trains, buildings, and even haystacks, was concentrated to the north and east in anticipation of Soviet raids. Heavy AA was concentrated to the south since the Americans, at the limit of their range, would likely come straight in. Thus, the planned westerly approach was well conceived.

The Raid. USAAF planners could not have foreseen three freak occurrences. First, on the climb to clear the coastal mountains, the lead bomber suddenly spun into the Adriatic. The deputy lead then broke formation to search for survivors, but the loaded bomber could not rejoin the formation and aborted. Suddenly Tidal Wave had lost its only two fully briefed navigators. Young 2nd Lt. William Wright in "Brewery Wagon" now became mission navigator. The second glitch was a wall of clouds extending from the mountains to 17,000'. The 376th and 93rd climbed above the cloud bank and rode a tailwind. The remaining groups penetrated at 12,000' and caught a head wind. Now the raiders approached in two separate formations. The third and most costly mistake occurred when Mission Commander BGen Uzal Ent second-guessed Wright and ordered a turn at the second of 3 IPs, taking the 376th and 93rd to Budapest. "Brewery Wagon" flew on to Ploesti alone and did not survive. Realizing Ent's error, Baker and Potts (93rd) veered north to approach Ploesti from the south. Compton (376th) followed. To compound his navigation error, Ent released bombardiers from their assigned targets to bomb targets of opportunity, and the 376th split up into small elements that approached Ploesti from the south, east, and north. The 5 groups with targets around Ploesti indeed arrived almost simultaneously, but over the same targets--and on collision courses! Johnson (44tli) and Kane (98th) saw smoke over their assigned targets and knew what it meant: alerted gunners, obscured targets and obstacles, exploding bombs, and oncoming B-24s. Neither hesitated to attack as planned. After correcting a navigation mishap, Wood's 389th bombed Steaua Romana in Campina with only minor interference from wayward 376th bombers. Only Posey's section of the 44th assigned to the Creditul Minier refinery 12 miles SW of Ploesti bombed its target completely as planned.

The Results. Two of the 7 assigned targets were not bombed, and 'in the next month their oil production 'increased from 47% of capacity to 92%. Four targets were hit by planes from different groups. Two were damaged, production falling from 66% to 28%, and two were completely shut down, one for 4 months and one for 11 months. Creditul Minier was shut down permanently.

The Cost. Of the 162 raiders to reach Ploesti (3 crashed and 13 aborted en route), 51 were lost and 22 landed (or crashed) at Allied bases on Malta, Sicily, and Cyprus. Of the 89 Liberators that returned to Benghazi that day, only 31 were flyable. Newby quotes Berlin Sally's succinct, accurate appraisal of the raid: "Nice job, Brereton, but you lost too many.

Sources:
Jablonski, E. (1971). Tragic Victories. New York-. Doubleday.
Newby, L. V, (1991). Into the Guns of Ploesti. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International.